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Theme: This ARI looks at the recent developments in Italian immigration policies carried 
out in 2008 by the conservative government of Silvio Berlusconi. 
 
 
Summary: The measures against irregular migration approved in 2008 have given rise to 
a wave of criticism across the EU. The Italian government of Silvio Berlusoni has been 
accused of racism while the Italian Minister of the Interior insists that his measures are 
simply reasonable ways of dealing with irregular immigration and guaranteeing the safety 
of Italian citizens. This paper argues that the new rules, although more uncertain than 
they seem at first glance (and sometimes thoroughly unpleasant), do not solve the 
contradictory logic of Italy’s immigration policies, with an increasing demand for foreign 
labour conflicting with the trend towards more restrictive measures. The main object of 
this paper is to show that the reform proposed by the Italian government is unlikely to 






Immigration Policy in the Name of Law and Order 
Since the migration crisis of the 1990s the development of the Italian migration regime is 
embedded in a deep contradiction. On the one hand Italy is under pressure to adopt 
restrictive practices from other EU Member States as well as from wide sectors of its own 
public opinion; on the other, Italian governments have to respond to an increasing 
structural demand for foreign labour.2 In times of restrictive orthodoxy, economic 
legitimation has thus become the most important factor to distinguish between what are 
perceived as ‘good’ immigrants, to be integrated, and ‘bad’ immigrants, without a regular 
stay permit and perhaps involved in criminal activities. Both the right- and the left-wing 
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1 From the famous dictum ‘Se vogliamo che tutto rimanga come è, bisogna che tutto cambi!’, uttered by the 
aristocrat-turned-revolutionary Tancredi in Tomasi di Lampedusa’s famous novel Il Gattopardo (Feltrinelli, 
Milan). 
 
2 For a general introduction on Italian immigration policy see L Einaudi (2007), Le politiche dell'immigrazione 
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parties have tried to build their immigration policies on the differentiation between legal 
immigration, described as useful to the economy, and illegal immigration, seen as a 
possible source of criminality. 
 
Such a differentiation was also in line with the ambiguous attitude of Italy’s citizens 
towards immigration. On the one hand, Italians are convinced that immigrants are 
necessary for the economy; on the other, they have developed the perception that 
illegality and criminality are deeply interrelated.3 The concern about security has been 
systematically exploited by populist right-wing parties such as the Lega Nord (Northern 
League), but the issue has been more recently recognised and dealt with by both the 
centre-left and the conservative parties. 
 
In October 2007, for instance, the centre-left government of Romano Prodi (2006-08) 
enacted a decree that allowed police forces to deport EU citizens and their family 
members from Italian soil if they were considered to be dangerous to public order. Decree 
nr 181/2007 was a political reaction to the heinous murder of an Italian woman by a 
Rumanian citizen, a crime that caused a wave of panic in the population. Left-wing critics 
of the Prodi government defined the decree as an ‘element of discontinuity’4 in the Italian 
Left that a few months earlier had drafted a new, and fairly liberal, law on migration issues 
(the Amato-Ferrero law), which was, however, never approved by the Italian Parliament 
due to the Prodi government’s collapse. Contrary to this, the moderate left defined the 
measures as reasonable and necessary. The then Vice-president of the Italian 
government, Francesco Rutelli, argued that it was the state’s political and institutional duty 
to guarantee the peaceful life of Italian citizens through the ‘rigor and severity’ of the law. 
 
During the national election campaign in 2008, it was especially the Lega Nord that 
consistently advocated the need for harsh measures against irregular migrants and 
foreign criminals. This time, however, the political importance of public order cut across 
the entire political spectrum: the candidate of the Partito Democratico (Democratic Party) 
and former Mayor of Rome, Walter Veltroni, declared repeatedly during the campaign that 
public order was a ‘universal right’, whose protection was beyond partisan politics 
(Corriere della Sera, 26/III/2008). 
 
Less than two months after winning the elections in April 2008, the conservative coalition5 
presented a new decree containing ‘urgent measures on public security’. Law-decree 
92/2008, which was subsequently converted into law 125/2008, changed the Italian Penal 
Code and made it possible to deport a foreigner or remove an EU-citizen in the event of 
him/her being found guilty of a crime carrying a sentence of more than two years 
imprisonment. The new decree also envisaged the possibility of imprisoning Italians or 
foreigners who had rented a flat to irregular citizens. Finally, it entrusted the Italian Army 
                                                 
3 Such perceptions are not caused only by xenophobic attitudes. Sound research has shown that the 
criminality rate among immigrants is relatively high. Rates vary, however, according to the type of crime. The 
lowest rates are for foreigners arrested for bank robbery (3% of the total number of those arrested in 2004-
06), followed by foreigners arrested for murder and sexual violence (32% and 39%, respectively). The highest 
rates mainly concern street thefts or house burglaries where the foreigners’ rate is between 50% and 70% of 
all those arrested. Nevertheless, the criminality rate for irregular foreigners is more than 70% of the total 
number of arrested foreigners in almost all crimes with the exception of gender-related violence. See 
Ministero dell’Interno (2007), ‘Rapporto sulla criminalità in Italia’, Roma. 
4 See F. Pastore (2007), ‘Se un delitto fa tremare l’Italia. Come si affronta una security crisis’, Italianieuropei, 
5, p. 19-32. 
5 The present government coalition ruled by Silvio Berlusconi is formed by Il Popolo della Libertà and Lega 
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with (limited) tasks of territorial control and gave special powers to city authorities in 
serious emergencies related, among others, to urban insecurity.6 
 
The new law was strengthened by a subsequent legislative decree aimed at converting 
into national law directive 2004/38/CE on the free circulation of EU citizens. According to 
this second decree, EU citizens can settle in Italy for more than three months only if they 
register their presence and are able to prove the existence of a legal income. 
Unregistered EU citizens can be removed for reasons of public security. The insistence on 
restrictive regulations for EU citizens can be seen as a late reaction to the EU’s 
enlargement to the East. In fact, the measures clearly targeted Rumanian gypsies with the 
aim of weakening the degree of protection they had gained from the enlargement process. 
 
The decree has revived the dichotomy between what are perceived to be ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
immigrants, making social marginality identical with troublesome immigration. Among its 
proponents, there has been a certain willingness to draw the line straight through the 
Rumanian immigrant flow, distinguishing between Rumanian Roma (the ‘bad’ side of 
immigration) and ‘good Rumanians’ working and living legally in Italy. This distinction has 
allowed the Italian government to even count on the support of several associations of 
Rumanian immigrants, desirous to distance themselves clearly from Roma Gypsies. 
 
A subsequent move was a ‘governmental ordinance’ (nr 3676 of 30/5/2008) that ordered 
the closure of informal Gypsy camps in three Italian regions (Lombardia, Lazio and 
Campania), the census of all their inhabitants and the taking of fingerprints of Gypsy 
minors. The ordinance produced widespread national and international rejection, as it was 
interpreted as an example of ethnically profiling Gypsies, in particular Rumanian ones. 
Against this, the Minister of Interior Roberto Maroni (Lega Nord) justified the ordinance by 
asserting the need to protect minors from exploitation and to guarantee their registration 
for schooling. He also stressed that a significant part of his legislation was based on drafts 
and documents prepared at the time of previous, centre-left, governments. 
 
The European Commissioner intervened in September 2008 acknowledging that the 
Italian measures could be considered non-discriminatory as long as the minors’ 
fingerprints were taken under the supervision of a judge and only for identification 
purposes. At the same time, the EU Commissioner Jacques Barrot said at the end of the 
same document that the automatic expulsion of EU citizens posed problems of 
compatibility with EU law and that, in the absence of legislative changes, the Commission 
would soon launch infringement proceedings. Eventually, in October 2008 the Minister of 
the Interior announced that some sections of the decree had been blocked because of the 
EU Commission’s negative judgement. 
 
The political activism of the Berlusconi government in the field of immigration does not, 
however, concern only ‘undesirable’ European citizens. The same government has also 
modified in a restrictive sense decrees 5/2007 and 251/2007, originally aimed at 
converting into national law directives 2004/83/CE and 2003/86/CE on respectively family 
reunion and common standards for asylum procedures. The new version of the first 
decree restricts the right of circulation of asylum seekers to specific areas for the entire 
length of the asylum hearings. The new version of the second law introduces some further 
restrictions to family-reunification procedures (see Table 1). 
                                                 
6 Security Pacts are not a new issue as, in November 2007, 15 Italian cities had already signed ‘Security 
Pacts’ between the central administration and the local authorities. 










Finally, the government has also drafted a law with ‘urgent norms on security matters’ that 
is supposed to introduce the ‘crime’ of illegal entry. Interestingly, the drafted law 
introduces measures against illegal migration together with other measures targeting 
begging and vandalism as well as the requisition of goods belonging to criminal 
organisations. If approved, irregular immigrants could be arrested and imprisoned for a 
period of between six months and four years. The law would also extend the length of 
possible detention in deportation centres (called CPT in Italian bureaucratic jargon) and 
would require a longer waiting period for foreign spouses of Italian citizens who wish to 
apply for naturalisation. At the international level, such reforms have been accompanied 
by a new cooperation agreement between the Italian and Libyan governments aimed, 
among other things, at increasing the control over clandestine migration.7 
 
Table 1. Legislative reforms proposed by the Berlusconi-government 
Topic Old rule New rule Legislative 
reference 
Deportation Deportation of a foreigner guilty 
of a crime with a sentence not 
inferior to 10 years 
Deportation of a foreigner or EU-
citizen in case of a sentence of 





60 days 60 days + 60 days up to a 
maximum of 18 months 
Draft law on 
security matters 
Irregular entry Devolution or order to leave the 
country (intimazione) if 
devolution is impossible 
Arrest and imprisonment for 
between 6 months and 4 years 




with an Italian 
citizen 
After six months of legal 
residence in Italy 
After two years of legal residence 
in Italy. Can be reduced to one 
year in the event of having children 
in common 
Draft law on 
security matters 
EU citizens The law requires registration on 
the municipal register. The 
municipal authority can limit the 
right of entry and residence for 
reasons of public security (if a 
foreigner’s behaviour threatens 
fundamental rights and public 
integrity) 
The law requires enrolment in the 
municipal register. The municipal 
authority can limit entry and 
residence for public security 
reasons and, in any case, if the EU 







Family reunion Applicants can be spouses, 
minors, children with no means 
of subsistence and parents in 
the country of origin without 
adequate family support 
Applicants can be spouses over 
the age of 18, children that for 
objective reasons have no means 
of subsistence or are handicapped, 
dependent parents without children 
in the country of origin or whose 
children are not able to provide 




Asylum No territorial limitations for 
residence 
Asylum seekers are assigned a 






The object of the overall legislative reform is obviously to strengthen the repressive 
dimension of Italy’s immigration policies. Any assessment of the consequences of these 
measures is clearly premature: some of the provisions are likely to change as a result of 
judicial review, others might run foul of EU law and still others will have to face the 
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the joint control of the maritime border. The agreement generated grave doubts about the Libyan authorities’ 
respect for human rights. 









administrative and budgetary inertia that has already severely curtailed the ambitions of 
previous repressive measures. Already at this stage, however, it can be argued that many 
of the measures might turn out to be scarcely effective in the struggle against irregular 
migration, as they fail to deal with the structural mechanisms sustaining irregular migration 
systems. 
 
The Importance of a ‘Positive’ Control Policy 
On the whole, the reforms carried out by the third Berlusconi government have so far 
merely tried to reduce immigration to a security issue. As such, the new measures target 
one of the symptoms rather than the causes of irregular migration. Irregular migration in 
Italy is a deep structural phenomenon: the presence of irregular migrants is embedded in 
a negative combination of the lack of an active recruitment channel for foreign labour, 
poor or weak internal controls and the existence of an extended informal economy. Given 
the acknowledged presence of a strong demand for foreign labour, to fight irregular 
migration requires the reform of the labour market rather than simply stricter border 
controls. 
 
First of all, Italy needs a reliable and predictable channel for recruiting foreign workers. 
Contrary to other European countries, Italian governments have always acknowledged the 
demand for foreign labour. In this respect, Italy has never fully subscribed to the European 
non-immigration dogma. However, the recruitment policies enacted have always been 
relatively counterproductive. The system of contingents established between 1986 and 
1990 has never become a real planning tool, as the yearly decrees were limited, delayed 
and nearly always based on unreasonable assumptions on the state of the Italian labour 
market. The first reform of the recruitment system was tried out by the centre-left 
government of Romano Prodi (1996-98). However, the entry quotas established by the 
Italian governments remained far below real demand (as reflected, among other 
indicators, by the number of applications presented by employers). Furthermore, it has not 
always been easy to mediate between the different political and social groups involved in 
the concrete use of quotas. Finally, there are still considerable difficulties due to the 
bureaucratic processes necessary to recruit foreign workers (Einaudi, 2007). The 
Berlusconi government has no official plans on this matter, thus disregarding one of the 
main stumbling blocks of Italian immigration policy. 
 
Even if immigration decreases as a result of the economic crisis, the need for an efficient 
recruitment system for foreign workers still remains urgent. The recession of 1991-92 in 
Italy was accompanied by a decrease in immigration flows. However, immigration did not 
stop, because there was a persistent demand for foreign workers in certain economic 
sectors. Similarly, it is likely that in the near future some economic sectors, such as 
construction, will need less immigrants while the need of Italian families to employ care 
workers for the elderly will probably remain unchanged. 
 
The second important factor regarding irregular migration is the quality of border controls 
–particularly maritime ones–, which has been a goal to which all Italian governments from 
1990 to today have been clearly committed. The effectiveness of border controls has 
undoubtedly improved in the last two decades: clandestine entries from the sea have 
steadily decreased, particularly along the Adriatic coasts.8 Over the same period, Italy has 
reformed the procedures for expulsion and deportation, as well as introduced the 
                                                 
8 P. Monzini, F. Pastore & G. Sciortino (2006), ‘Schengen’s Soft Underbelly? Irregular Migration and Human 
Smuggling across Land and Sea Borders to Italy’, International Migration, 44, p. 1-25. 









possibility of the administrative detention of the foreigner to be expelled. This has 
contributed to reducing the interval between an expulsion order being issued and the 
expulsion being carried out. Effectiveness was also improved by a more intensive 
international cooperation and by the introduction of privileged quotas to be granted to 
countries that cooperate with Italy in the framework of bilateral agreements. In fact, the 
percentage of expelled foreigners is much higher for citizens from countries that have 
signed a readmission agreement with Italy.9 
 
The main factor in fostering an irregular migration system is, however, the existence of a 
sizeable informal economy. Italy’s informal economy represents 22.3% of its GDP and 
provides the main avenue for irregular migrants’ income-making activities. The fight 
against irregular migration would above all require controlling illegal employment, and this 
in turn would require combating the informal economy. In Italy, however, labour market 
controls are scarce and ineffective, and very often slow. Italy lacks an efficient 
administrative organisation to carry them out and the labour inspector’s task is made all 
the more difficult by a variety of bureaucratic loopholes. Furthermore, the informal 
economy is part of a civic culture which is very tolerant towards irregular employment. For 
these reasons, struggling effectively against this phenomenon would also mean interfering 
in the complicated relationship between State and Society.10 In the absence of effective 
internal controls, regularisation has been the most important instrument to control the 
irregular employment of immigrants, allowing the transfer of foreign labour from the 
informal to the formal economy. Since 1986, Italian governments have regularised almost 
1.4 millions foreigners and most of them still have their residence permits. This means 
that regularisations not only contribute to regaining control over irregular flows but also 
help to stabilise the foreign population. With the passage of time regularisation has 
become a typical crisis management tool of Italy’s migration regime, marking a certain 
continuity between right- and left-wing coalitions.11 When the enactment of a new amnesty 
has been politically unfeasible, it has been carried out under different names: for instance, 
in 2006, the Prodi government increased the recruitment contingent in order to absorb all 
the applications filed by employers. The decision was based on the assumption that the 
applications had actually been filed for workers already irregularly living in the country. 
Paradoxically, Italian parties are aware that regularisations do not reflect a rational 
immigration policy but are effective only as an instrument to manage failure. For this 
reason, they have always been presented as one-off measures. 
 
                                                 
9 As outlined by a report of the Italian Ministry of the Interior in 2007, the improvement in Italy’s border 
controls, however, was followed by a significant decrease in expulsions since the beginning of 2002. The 
decrease could be related to the entry of Rumania and Bulgaria in the EU together with the diminishing effect 
of readmission agreements. Furthermore, the cooperation of sending countries might have been affected by 
the reduction of the privileged quotas in the first years of the second Berlusconi government (2001-06). 
Finally, due to budgetary problems, Italian governments had increasing difficulties in guaranteeing adequate 
funding for expulsions. Finally, the presence of irregular migrants does not depend only on the state of Italy’s 
control system. Other EU governments can be equally important. The generous visa policy of the German 
government between 2000 and 2005 facilitated the entry of Eastern European immigrants to other European 
countries, mainly Italy and Spain. See C. Finotelli & G. Sciortino (2006), ‘Looking for the European Soft 
Underbelly: Visa Policies and Amnesties for Irregular Migrants in Germany and Italy’, in S. Baringhorst, J.F. 
Hollifield & U. Hunger (Eds.), Herausforderung Migration – Perspektiven der vergliechenden 
Politikwissenschaft, LIT Verlag, Munster, p. 249-280. 
10 G. Sciortino (1999), ’Planning in the Dark: the Evolution of Italian Immigration Control’, in G. Brochmann & 
T. Hammar (Eds.), Mechanisms of Immigration Controls, Berg, Oxford, p. 233-260. 
11 A. Colombo & G. Sciortino (2003), ‘The Bossi-Fini Law: Explicit Fanaticism, Implicit Moderation and 
Poisoned Fruits’, in J. Blondel & P. Segatti, Italian Politics 2003, Berg, Oxford, p. 162-180. 









Conclusion: In the last decade, Italy has seen increasing, although intermittent, efforts to 
improve the quality of both the legal recruitment of foreign workers and the control of 
border crossings. Such efforts, however, have been unable to reduce irregular migration 
significantly, as Italy’s informal economy is still a powerful magnet for irregular migrants. 
To fight irregular migration in the Italian context requires a drastic improvement in the 
effectiveness of legal recruitment procedures while at the same time sharply reducing the 
appeal of irregular employment. Unfortunately, things are not moving in that direction. The 
current policy trend in Italy is mainly to focus on the repressive side of immigration policy, 
forgetting –as we have seen– that irregular migration depends on a more complex set of 
factors. It is consequently likely that repressive measures will fail to halt the constant 
reproduction of irregularity, leaving things as they are despite the shrill appeal to the need 
for greater security. 
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